

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 2, Folder 17

September 25, 1954-
December 17, 1954

0621

Bates, 1953

This is very important.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Rear Admiral Redman)

Confidential letter to Fleet Admiral Nimitz of 11 May 1953

Giving the story of the famous "Where is Task Force 34"
Dispatch to Admiral Halsey in the Battle of Leyte in 1944

0622

25 September 1954

Dear Captain Jones:

The World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the Naval War College is conducting a strategical and tactical analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

During the period to October 19th, 1944, when Search Plan Fox became effective Search Plan Easy was in effect. The searches were to cover 1000 miles with the exception of Sector 4, which was to cover 750 miles.

On October 15th, 1944, General Kenney (COMAAF SWPA) advised Commander Fifth Air Force that CINCPAC had requested maximum possible air reconnaissance of exits from Surigao and San Bernardino Straits beginning daylight, October 16th, and directed him to comply.

Commander Fifth Air Force, therefore, extended Sector 5 to cover the above exits.

SWPA intelligence reports show that this was done for Sector 5 and that normal searches (1000 miles for sectors 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 and 750 miles for sector 4) were flown.

However, VPB 115's War Diary states that all seven sectors were extended to 1100 miles during October 16th, 17th and 18th.

Your War Diary (That is, ComFairWing 17's) does not show that you ordered such an extension, although it is most likely that, if done, it was ordered by you. Can you remember?

There are several other points which we are interested in clearing up. Specifically, was Sector 4 extended to 1000 or 1100 miles, and if so, would the plane commander (PB4Y's) be directed to fly over land and notably over Mindanao which at this time was being prepared by the Japanese against invasion? Was Search Plan Fox flown over land?

I am sorry to bother you about this but you appear to be the only source available.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain Carlton B. Jones, USN
OSN, Room 4E710, Pentagon
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0623

27 September 1954

Dear John:

I was talking today on the phone with Admiral Watkins and I found out, to my disappointment, that the plans which you and I both have had, and which we had been advised would probably be made effective, have fallen through. I refer to the microfilming of the Japanese documents in the National Archives. I also learned, to my disappointment, that your ten-year program is temporarily dead. You may have more information on the latter than I have but the fact that Mrs. Tanaka is being released indicates the verity of the above remarks.

I am very sorry that we are losing Mrs. Tanaka as I find there is still a need for her but alas, the War College has no funds and there seems no other way to hold her. Admiral Watkins told me in this connection that they were making an effort to place her in State or in the CIA, in which case we could borrow her without too much effort. I did not argue with him about this but in my own experience I found it impossible to borrow anybody from the CIA. I helped get translators there from the WDC and I was promised all sorts of friendly cooperation. However, the minute they got behind the closed doors they decided they did not want to loan translators to anyone and it was for that reason we had to engage our own translators. Admiral Olson, who was connected with the CIA then, told me that actually they weren't too busy but they didn't want to start a precedent.

Therefore, having had no experience with State, I would prefer that she be signed up by State. At least I can make an effort there.

I am enclosing herewith the Navy-Notre Dame ticket you requested. I am sorry I didn't get it to you before but I had misplaced the request cards and only found them on Saturday. I appreciate very much the help you gave me in association with Mrs. Tanaka and I shall write an official letter from the War College to your command in appreciation of your assistance. I hope that you will succeed in keeping

0624

27 September 1954

an eye on Mrs. Tanaka as I may want to get her back presently.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral John J. Heffernan, USN
Chief of Naval History
Room 2509 Main Navy
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0625

27 September 1954

Dear Admiral Hewitt:

I was very delighted to receive your note of September 22nd, informing me that you were expecting to be back in Orwell by October 1st and planned to remain there until about November 1st, then to go to Annapolis. This shows that you have recovered from your serious illness and are back again in harness, which pleases me very much, indeed. You are obviously a pretty tough cookie! If you are in the mood I can send you Volume II at Orwell, but I will call first to ascertain that you are there.

I am still interested in having you review this book because I have made many comments on the Japanese strategical and tactical thinking and I want to be sure that what I said meets with your approval. It is very difficult to find anyone who is qualified to discuss this matter and since you are one of our top military brains I feel that I must persist in bothering you about this.

My experience here in the Naval War College is to the effect that most of our people comment, in general, on the clerical and technical errors of my analyses with practically no comment on the real "meat" of the book, the strategical and tactical thinking of the commanders above referred to. When I have asked officers to review the volumes in the past they have done a good job in finding the above technical and clerical errors referred to, but they have supplied little in mental power. This is of great concern to me because more and more sound thinking will be required in our high command in the future to accomplish adequately their military objectives with possibly inferior forces. I want them to be prepared to meet this challenge adequately. Frankly, it is for that reason that I am writing these books.

With best regards to you and Floride and congratulations on your obvious recovery, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN(Ret)
U.S. Naval Hospital
Bethesda, Md.

0626

29 September 1954

Dear Bowker:

Thank you for your letter of September 8th, wherein you commented on yourself and Hartman being selected for promotion and wherein you commented upon Nellie and Albert II and your contemplated trips, one through the Mediterranean and you to the U.S. I think that you are quite right in your viewpoint that you should exploit the advantages of your situation to the fullest, and I see clearly that you are doing just that.

A problem has arisen here concerning Search Plan Fox. I am sending you herewith two overlays, one of which seems to be right, the other wrong. Overlay A is the diagram submitted by both COMSOWESPAC and CG Fifth Air Force. Overlay B is the diagram you made which differs from the above in Sectors X and Y. Apparently, the basic plan called for Sector X to be 321 to 333, and Sector Y, 333 to 345. However, your plan shows Sector X as 321 to 329, and Sector Y as 329 to 345. Can you tell me why you changed the dividing line between Sectors X and Y from 333 to 329?

This letter is short because we are listening to the World Series - our vote in here favors the Indians 7-2. Poor old Giants!

With best regards to you and yours, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Commander Albert H. Bowker, USN
Air Transport Squadron TWENTY-FOUR
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, N.Y.

0627

4 October 1954

Dear Frog:

Thank you for your letter of 29 September referring to your plan to read Volume II as quickly as possible. I repeat here again what I said in my previous letter, to wit: I am very pleased that you are giving me the benefit of your experience.

You will note that these volumes in no way resemble Morison's books, in that Morison writes a personalized, and in some ways, superficial volume, whereas these War College volumes endeavor to go into the "root" of things. Morison has the advantage of the War College volumes when he writes his own books, and, therefore, he delays certain volumes until he is sure that the research work of this section is far enough advanced to permit him to use it steadily.

The manner of writing the War College volumes is quite new. Apparently, no battle before was ever analyzed on this level, nor were the conduct of the commanders discussed so freely and fully. When we first started on this there was considerable wonder as to whether the Navy Department would permit comments of the nature therein contained. But to the great delight of Admiral Spruance and myself, the Navy Department (through Admiral D.C. Ramsey) told us to go ahead freely and to develop our own format.

When I was in California the other day, I told Admiral Nimitz that in Volume I we had had to comment on some of his plans and operations, to which Admiral Nimitz replied that he wished the Commander-in-Chief to be criticized if his decisions merited it. He further said that if I didn't criticize him under these conditions, I wasn't the fellow they thought I was when they gave me this assignment.

You will note that this volume, is in considerable detail for each of the top commanders and, therefore, each volume is quite long. The study will consume possibly seven volumes. Volume II, except for the criticisms, is finished and Volumes III and possibly IV, about half done. It is very difficult because in commenting we must have the facts and must be fair. So far, I have been told that, in the opinion of everyone, we have been entirely fair. I hope that this opinion continues.

0628

4 October 1954

I thought that, as an old (?) submariner, you might be interested particularly in the operations of the submarines because it was the group off the Bungo Suido, which, by modifying their own orders, permitted the Japanese forces to pass out through the Bungo on October 20th entirely undetected. The submarine writeup has been checked by the top submarine officers here at the War College and has met with their approval. I hope that it meets with yours.

You will note that, in commenting, everything is objective and no names are mentioned, except where necessary. This is done so that the reader need not be concerned with anything but the military facts.

New subject. I didn't know that your wife was the daughter of the Mark Requas. I think I met Mark Requas long ago. I remember him very well in that he was an extremely important citizen of the United States, in general, and of California, in particular. I remember that he was way up in the Republican councils, and was, I think, the Republican National Committeeman from California. And I remember also, that he was in mining, but whether it was oil or copper, I can not remember. He was a very fine citizen!

Please tell her also that I am not the Charlie Bates' from Piedmont, but the H.L.A. Bates of Alameda. Both of my parents have now joined their parents.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral Francis S. Low, USN
Commander, Western Sea Frontier
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0629

5 October 1954

Dear Captain Jones:

The World War II Battle Evaluation Group of the Naval War College is conducting a strategical and tactical analysis of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

During the period to October 19th, 1944, when Search Plan Fox became effective Search Plan Easy was in effect. The Searches were to cover 1000 miles with the exception of Sector 4, which was to cover 750 miles.

On October 15th, 1944, General Kenney (COMAAF SWPA) advised Commander Fifth Air Force that CINCPAC had requested maximum possible air reconnaissance of exits from Surigao and San Bernardino Straits beginning daylight, October 16th, and directed him to comply.

Commander Fifth Air Force, therefore, extended Sector 5 to cover the above exits.

SWPA intelligence reports show that this was done for Sector 5 and that normal searches (1000 miles for Sectors 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 and 750 miles for Sector 4) were flown.

However, VPB 115's War Diary states that all seven sectors were extended to 1100 miles during October 16th, 17th and 18th.

Your War Diary (that is, ComFairWing 17's) does not show that you ordered such an extension, although it is most likely that, if done, it was ordered by you. Can you remember?

There are several other points which we are interested in clearing up. Specifically, was Sector 4 extended to 1000 or 1100 miles, and if so, would the plane commander (PB4Y's) be directed to fly over land and notably over Mindanao which at this time was being prepared by the Japanese against invasion? Was Search Plan Fox flown over land?

I am sorry to bother you about this but you appear to be the only source available. Please return the enclosed charts.

Very sincerely yours,

Captain Carroll B. Jones, USN(ret) R. W. BATES
307 Downing Street,
New Smyrna, Florida

0630

7 October 1954

Dear Roger:

I would be very ungenerous, with the detachment of Mrs. Tanaka, not to thank you personally for your very great help to me in this translation work. I think it quite fair to say that the translation work would have been of far less value had you not assisted me by acting as my "agent" in your area.

I have told Mrs. Tanaka that since she was no longer working directly for the Naval War College it is quite proper for her to retain my letter. Thank you, however, for your help in this matter.

Now that both Mr. Kawakami and Mrs. Tanaka are no longer with us I hope that you will not feel that our contact should thereby be dissolved. On the contrary, I think our contact has been most friendly and profitable and I am quite anxious that it should continue on the high level which it has occupied for the past few years.

If there is anything I can do for you in any of these matters, a word from you will be sufficient to move me unto action.

With best regards and many thanks, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Roger Pineau
Room 2517, Office of
Naval Records & History
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0631

11 October 1954

Dear Frog:

I am sending you herewith as an enclosure that portion of the Introduction which you have not yet received, a re-write of Page 77, and the Epilogue.

The change of particular interest is Page 77 which has to do with the "alongside" relief of submarines. I have modified this page to satisfy the criticism which I received from Admiral Tichenor (Retired), who was the operations officer of CTF 71 during the Leyte operations.

Alongside reliefs, as you probably well know, were made in the Pacific, but generally the relief was not an alongside one, but as pointed out at the top of Page 77, the submarine came into an area at the time the other submarine left. This was designed to avoid mistaken identity.

However, Captain Hogan, who was recently Operations Officer for ComSubPac and was in command of a submarine in the Western Pacific, states that this method also had its drawbacks because the submarine might go into an area thinking that his predecessor had already retired when he had in fact not retired. He stated that he had had this experience and had run into his departed (?) predecessor while trailing a convoy. He said it was only luck that the two submarines didn't begin attacking one another.

The way the page is now written meets with the approval of the top submarine officers here, notably Captain Hogan, Captain Titus, and Commander Keithly.

Alongside reliefs are, I understand, made today in some areas.

With best regards to you and yours, and with hopes that I am not troubling you too much by these changes, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral Francis S. Low, USN
Commander Western Sea Frontier
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0632

12 October 1954

Dear John:

I am glad to discover that your final efforts have succeeded and that Mrs. Tanaka is now fully under your wing. I am sure that she will do a fine job and I am also sure that the results will be of importance to our Country.

About two days before the final decision was made, I had a long telephone conversation with Admiral Watkins. I had done my utmost to have her transferred to you. Apparently, Mr. LeMay wasn't able to recommend that it be done. At least, that was the impression I got, although Mr. LeMay may have recommended it and Admiral Watkins have disapproved it. However, this seems doubtful because Admiral Watkins was always in favor of it. It seems clear that somehow someone even higher up finally approved of your plans, at least in so far as the microfilming goes.

I have received a copy of Volume 9, "Sicily-Salerno-Anzio", and have written my thanks to Sam. I think it should be an interesting volume and feel that there should be some comments in the press about it.

With best regards and many thanks for your information contained in your letter of October 5th, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan, USN
Chief of Naval History
Room 2509
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0633

13 October 1954

Dear Lee:

Since almost three months have elapsed since I was last in New York I am quite concerned over the progress of the filming of the Battle of Savo Island. As I told you long ago, we have been planning to use this film, if we can, this fall, i.e., during the month of December and more especially, during the week 8 to 15 December for the instruction of our Command and Staff class.

When in Washington about a month ago, I spoke to Mr. G.I. Johnson about a meeting and he said they were planning to have one right away. I have heard nothing about the meeting.

I know that we have to record the Battle Lessons, and I also know that you were planning to send me some of your thoughts in this matter. To date I have heard nothing. The battle lessons, while desirable, are not vital for the December showing.

Can it be that the above film has been set aside for other work temporarily, or have you become bogged down somehow?

Outside of that, how are you? With best regards, I am,
as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc.
245 West 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

(Copy to Mr. G.I. Johnson)

0634

13 October 1954

Dear Admiral Hewitt:

In view of the fact that you are planning to leave Orwell the latter part of this month, I thought that if it meets with your approval I would proceed to Orwell sometime near the end of the month and there obtain from you your comments on Volume II.

If you think this unnecessary, I will not do it, of course. It could be possible that you are planning, in your movement south, to drive through Newport, in which case I could get the comments directly from you, or perhaps you would prefer to mail your comments in. What I am endeavoring to point out is that I appreciate your kindness in reviewing this volume, particularly when you are convalescing from your serious illness, and I want to do all I can to make the way as easy as possible for you.

Things are going along very well here in my office. Volume II is awaiting the critics, after which it will be prepared for printing. I am about to tackle Volume III, for which I have most of the data, but it will take some time. I have also worked on Surigao Strait but I have been stalled on that one because of the necessity of going ahead with Volumes II, III and possibly IV.

Likewise, things are going along well in Newport. The Quendecin met last night with your old friend, Brigham, in the chair as usual, and with thirty-one members present. The speaker was Robert Buell, recently Consul General in Edinburgh. His talk was on the Foreign Service and was well received. You were missed, as always.

Admiral McCormick seems to be in very good health and both he and his wife are exceedingly popular in Newport. This is a good thing for the College.

I hope that you haven't been suffering due to the weather up there in Vermont. The strange weather we have been having in Newport, i.e., high temperature and high humidity, then

0635

13 October 1954

low temperatures all of a sudden, makes it surprising that very few have colds out of this strange variation of temperature.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN(Ret)
"The Foretop"
Orwell, Vermont

0636

18 October 1954

Dear Frog:

Thank you very much for the return of the manuscript and for your very helpful and penetrating criticisms. They are of considerable value to us and I am already working on them. I regret exceedingly that you did not have any diagrams. It was purely an error and until I had received your letter I had no knowledge that you did not have them. I am sending the three original diagrams for Volume II to you under separate cover so that you may look at them and then you may keep them if you like or destroy them. Modifications are being made in them but nothing of any importance except the weather, which will be inserted when the diagrams are complete.

With regard to your points:

Item A: I have accepted this correction and have prepared a short comment thereon. I have then referred the reader to Volume I, Pages xxxix and xl, wherein there is a discussion of the process of making the change from seizing Mindanao to seizing Leyte, and of advancing the date for seizing Leyte from December 20th to October 20th. You might be interested in reading what is said in Volume I.

Item B: I think that you have a very good point here. I will point out that the Japanese themselves, in Admiral Ozawa's study of September 10th, pointed out that this force must have its own organic aircraft, the inference being that they had little confidence in the ability of their naval land-based aircraft to provide adequate protection and coordinated air striking power.

Item C and D: This is a point that I have been working over during the past month. It is a very worthwhile project because, as you say, "he's" can be confusing.

Item E: This is a very pertinent criticism, but it is one which is difficult to do anything about. The same problem came up in the other volumes. All information is not available and all information will never be available to any writer of any analytical document, even if every dispatch and every piece of paper, and every statement made at the time were made available to him. This is so because, despite anything written later thereon by the commander, the writer would not really know what had actually been in the mind of the commander at the time the decision was rendered. I have seen commanders make decisions for which they could give no logical reason. Later I have seen them provide the most brilliant reasons - which had been thought up later.

0637

18 October 1954

I have found in my studies that "the finest memory is less enduring than the poorest ink", and therefore, the statements made today by some commanders, while perhaps honestly made, often differ considerably from the statements made at the time. In this connection, I want you to know that one senior Admiral of World War II, in commenting upon these analyses, said to another senior Admiral, that "Bates is working this up from evidence made at the time but some of the evidence wasn't right and therefore he ought to take what they say today as right." My reply to that was that it would not be a correct study of the action if I took statements made today and said that that was the commander's thought process at the time, when his statements at the time indicated something else. Von Clausewitz pointed out long ago that such statements are not very good because they are bound to reflect favorably on the commander's actions. Don't misunderstand me here. I like to get the statements from the commanders but if it conflicts with statements made at the time I cannot give them full weight.

Item F: Once again I cannot tell you how apologetic I am about our failure to send you the charts, or diagrams as we call them. An analysis cannot be written without such diagrams, and it wasn't fair to ask you to comment without them. However, your comments indicate that you were able to visualize the situation much better than most people might have been able to do, and I am thankful that you could.

With best regards to you and yours, and with many thanks for what you have done, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral F. S. Low, U.S. Navy
Commander Western Sea Frontier
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0638

27 October 1954

Dear Lee:

After my trying adventures at 245 West 55th Street, I finally landed in my airplane at LaGuardia and relaxed. I kept relaxing there and the plane did not take off, so I finally queried as to what was the matter - then I was informed that the plane had something wrong with it and that we would be delayed until they got a new plane. I arrived home at 11:45.

I thought that our work there on Monday and Tuesday was very effective and I appreciated the friendly manner with which you viewed the changes in the script. The errors in the script were brought about in part because the script is supposed to be done by the Naval Photographic Center, and was so in this case, helped by this office. However, I had to reject it and I completed it myself. Obviously, I did not and could not check every item and it was those items that I didn't check which are causing our trouble today. The diagrams must be right, and it is for that reason that I appreciate the broad manner with which you are meeting this requirement.

I have talked to the responsible people to ascertain an answer to the questions which arose during the discussions. These were:

- a. Were the Quincy guns trained out prior to 0155?
The answer is no. They were not trained out until later, just before firing.
- b. Did the commanding officer wear a life jacket?
The answer is no; whereas most of the personnel did wear life jackets. It seems quite correct to say that the commanding officers and often the bridge crew did not wear them owing to the crowded conditions; also to the fact that many people came on the bridge under an emergency alert, and didn't have time to grab their life jackets. Therefore, I think that it would be well to remove the life jackets from the silhouettes of the commanders.

I have discovered a dispatch report referring to the JARVIS which states:

"The JARVIS's bottom and decks up to the superstructure were ruptured and flooded between Frames 25-60."

I have also found a report that this damage was abreast Gun

0639

27 October 1954

No. 2. I have, therefore, drawn a sketch indicating, approximately, the hole in the bow. This sketch is based on a damage report of another destroyer which showed damage at about Frame 90 but, for our purposes, I moved it forward to Frame 45 into the correct position. I think that if you will use this drawing (Diagram "A"), it will be quite adequate for our purposes.

I am sending to you under separate cover a report on the QUINCY, ASTORIA, and VINCENNES, entitled "Loss in Action" which gives the data of where the hits were made which should be very helpful to David. Please sign the custody receipt which we will forward with this publication, and return it.

I have no picture of the general alarm here but the general belief is that, like my drawing herewith forwarded as Diagram "B", it was circular, with a depth of about one and one half inches, and with a lever on the face of it, which lever was moved to the right and automatically anchored there until the time when the general alarm had completed ringing.

I cannot find exactly what the pattern of the Japanese eight-inch salvos was, but from the picture of the pattern in the firing against the Gambier Bay in the battle off Samar and from the comments of the gunnery officers of the SALT LAKE CITY at the battle off Komandorski, I think we are safe to give a pattern in range of 300 yards, and in deflection of about 30 yards, as per Diagram "C" enclosed.

With best regards, I am, as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc.
245 West 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

0640

1 November 1954

Dear John:

I notice this morning that a letter dated September 27th, 1954, Serial 2162, of the Naval War College, has been forwarded by BuPers to you for action.

I would appreciate it if you would give this letter your personal attention as we are trying to find the correct names of the various unit commanders in the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I have discovered that some of the names of the lesser unit commanders in my Volume I of the Battle for Leyte Gulf are in error due to the fact that the source material available to this command was not corrected up to date by the Fleet commanders. We have discovered, in a number of the deck logs, the changes in command which occurred, which changes are not shown elsewhere. This LST 206 is a case in point. I have been trying to find the commander of the task group who was in that ship. Volume I gives no name. We suspect that the unit commander was Lieutenant Commander Karl A. Lindquist, U.S. Coast Guard, but we are not sure. It seems likely that the deck log of LST 206, which deck log is probably in the National Archives, should show this. However, you have many sources and I feel confident that you will be able to produce the right name.

With best regards, and with regret that the Navy lost the Notre Dame game, which I know you attended and which must have been a terrible disappointment, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral John J. Heffernan, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval History
Room 2509 Main Navy
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0641

1 November 1954

Dear Rollo:

Sometime ago I addressed you a letter asking if you cared to review Volume II of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I don't know whether you ever got this letter because another I addressed at the same time likewise seems to have received no answer.

Since writing to you I have had Volume II reviewed by Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, for strategy and tactics, and for the same by Vice Admiral F. S. Low; for minesweepers, by Captain Wayne R. Loud, who commanded the minesweepers for SOWESPAC; for submarines, by Admiral Murray J. Tichenor; and for weather by Captain J.C.S. McKillip. All have been very commendatory indeed!

I don't know that it is necessary to have it reviewed by anyone else as I have a new staff in my office now, one of whom is a submariner, two are airmen, and one is a surface officer; all have been reviewing the volume heavily for the past several months. However, I also feel that, in view of the fact that you were present as operations officer for Admiral Halsey, you might be interested in seeing what has been said concerning the operations of that force. Very frankly, off-hand I think the only comment we really had was concerning the fact that Admiral Halsey operated directly with the carrier task groups and did not operate through CTF 38, Admiral Mitscher. I showed that section to Admiral Burke, who admitted that this was so and said he thought that the reason he did it was because he liked to do it that way. Do you happen to know anything about that?

Would you be interested in reading this chapter? I know that you are very busy and perhaps you do not have time but I want to be sure that the opportunity has been offered to you at least.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral R. E. Wilson, USN
Commander Cruiser Division THREE
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0642

3 November 1954

Dear Eddie:

I know you are very busy down there with matters far removed from this, but I also know that you have maintained your interest in the Japanese language and people.

As you know, I have been working on the Battle for Leyte Gulf for some time and have now completed Volumes I and II. I haven't been satisfied with the names of the commanders and chiefs of staff that we have in Volume I, and I have been having the Army Military History Section, Far East, who have been very helpful to me, check these. They have Captain Toshikazu Ohmae as one of their advisors.

We have listed as the Chief of Staff, Mobile Force, Rear Admiral Keizo Furumura, IJN. We got that name, as well as most of the others, from the revised Register of Japanese Naval Officers, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 124-45, dated 1 July 1945. The Army says it was Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi. We had listed as the Chief of Staff, Philippine Force, Vice Admiral Hidehiko Nishio; the Army has Rear Admiral Kyugoro Shimamoto. The Army says that Admiral Keizo Furumura, referred to above, was Admiral Komura, instead of Furumura. The Army has listed COMDESDIV 61 as Captain Amano on one occasion, and on another occasion as Shigetaka Amano, and then in a note refer to him as Shigeru. We have him as Shigetaka. Which is correct?

In addition to the request for the above information, I am forwarding herewith a copy of the Japanese organization for October 17th, 1944, as forwarded by the Army. Here you will observe that the organization shows Rear Admirals in command of the AMAGI, ZUIKAKU, HYUGA, ISE, YAMATO, MUSASHI, NAGATO, YAMASHIRO, FUSO, ATAGO, MYOKO, KONGO, and the HARUNA. This seems untrue to me as I am confident that all of them were Captains. What is correct? Rear Admiral Doi's name is given as Naoharu, whereas the CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin gives it as Naoji. Finally, under the Submarine Force, there is listed the CHIKUSHI MARU, whereas all translations refer to it as the TSUKUSHI MARU.

0643

3 November 1954

I hope you don't mind my writing to you about this, but I would like to get these names right since the Army appears to have given them to me partially right and partially wrong. I would appreciate your help.

With best regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, USN
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E964 Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

0644

5 November 1954

Dear Admiral Struble:

Thank you very much for writing to Hanson Baldwin concerning his article on the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Of course, it is ridiculous to say that Admiral Kinkaid was in command when the commander, in fact, was Admiral Oldendorf. Admiral Kinkaid was the strategic commander and Admiral Oldendorf the tactical commander. Unfortunately, Baldwin's article was rather poor and did not have the facts at all. Very frankly, he wished to come up here and get the facts from me, but the Navy Department denounced me for allowing him to even see the book. I told him that I thought he was entitled to see the book as he was a guest of the Global Strategy discussions, and that I would show it to him again unless I had orders to the contrary. However, Baldwin did not get any facts when he was here with Global Strategy, and I was unable to give him any thereafter.

One of the items that was wrong in the article, although I could notice many, was his statement that no one knew that the Japanese fleet had turned around and was heading eastward again. To quote Baldwin: "Two hours later, near Sibuyan Island, the giant MUSASHI, pride of Kurita's Central Force, loses her long fight, Sore wounded, the greatest battleship in the world cap-sizes and takes with her to the depths half her crew. But no American sees her passing. And No American sees Kurita, earlier in the afternoon, alter his course once more, and, at 1714, head once again with his battered but still powerful Central Force back toward San Bernardino Strait."

This, of course, was untrue because at 2024, Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Kinkaid that the enemy Central Force was moving on a course of 120°(T) in the Sibuyan Sea toward the northern tip of Masbate Island, and in the same dispatch stated that he was proceeding north with three groups to attack the enemy carrier forces (Northern Force) at dawn.

I haven't time to point out all of the inaccuracies in the Baldwin article. It was interesting, and these people who read it, and didn't know the facts, enjoyed it. However, I am so insistent on facts in my writings that it is difficult to approve anything not correct.

0645

5 November 1954

I hope that you are in good shape and enjoying your job. Presently, I hope to see you in New York. Until then, with best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral A. D. Struble, USN
Room 2111, Two Park Avenue
New York 16, N.Y.

0646

November 12, 1954

Dear Lee :

I have studied the sequences and I find them satisfactory. As regards the diagrams themselves, my only comment is that I think that the yardage such as 9400 yards at 0151 might be put in a more simple manner. I would rather have the range placed nearer the tracings indicating the trajectories possibly as shown by the dotted lines. Can you think of something better?

I have made some changes in the wording of the sequences.

When do you desire to hold your next meeting? My suggestion is that, because I will be at the Navy League banquet in New York as the guest of the League on the night of November 23rd, it would be well to have this meeting on the 22nd so that we can run over into the 23rd if we want to.

With best regards to you and to the staff working on this film, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc.
245 West 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

0647

15 November 1954

Dear Rip:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 10th, wherein you commented upon my request for information about Lieutenant O'Neill and also on Volume I of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I am sorry that you don't know O'Neill's first name, because his is one of the two names that we have been unable to locate.

With reference to your comments, I should like to handle them categorically:

1. With relation to your comments concerning the Allied landing at Suluan, you are correct in your supposition that it was a communication point for the Japanese forces. The point is that the Japanese first sighted your forces off Suluan Island and thereafter for days referred to them as the Allied forces off Suluan. Therefore, Suluan, although as you say it was the smallest of the three landings, was, in the Japanese minds, primary and vital.

2. Your recollections about the location of the Fleet forces at 0719 are not correct. The HUGHES, your flagship, sighted Desolation Point (Dinagat Island) at 0724, bearing 277°(T). The STACK, in column with you, did not sight it until 0734. Your 0800 position showed that your group must have been at 0719 about eighteen miles to the eastward of Desolation Point. This is supported by the KILTY, which at 0712 reported Dinagat Island as bearing 278°(T), distant 18 miles.

3. With relation to your comments concerning the competence of a decision made by Admiral Kinkaid, I want you to know that I think that in view of your own experience as a task force commander you could well be correct. However, because I was not sure of the accuracy of these comments, I referred them to Admiral Kinkaid for an opinion. He replied that they were exactly correct. It will be observed that the message reporting this decision was sent out by Admiral Kinkaid as COMSEVENTHFLT, and not as Commander Central Philippines Attack Force.

With reference to your comments about CTGs 78.3 and 78.4. I did not include them in the list of principal commanders in Volume I because I did not think that they were principal commanders there. Perhaps CTGs 77.2 and 77.4, on that basis, were also not principal commanders, but since these two commanders fought two of the major naval actions, it seemed wise to include them in Volume I. In Volume II, which

0648

15 November 1954

is now finished, which includes your operations, you are included as a principal commander.

I expect to be in New York next Monday and Tuesday in connection with the filming of the Battle of Savo Island being made at Film Graphics, and I expect to remain in New York for the Navy League Banquet, where I will represent the War College. Admiral McCormick and Admiral Robbins are unable to go. I hope to see you there, if not before.

I want you to know that I appreciate very much your interest in reading and pointing out the possible errors in this study. We are always seeking criticisms in order to insure that our work is entirely correct.

You will be interested to know that Volume II has been reviewed by "Frog" Low, for one, who was extremely complimentary about it. One thing that Frog liked was the fact that it is, as far as possible, purely objective.

With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN
Room 2111, 2 Park Avenue
New York, 16, N.Y.

0649

16 November 1954

Dear Bowker:

Every now and then we will persist in bothering you if we cannot locate information supposedly available in our shop. If you will remember we were trying to find COMSEVENTHFLT's files so that we would know when he had received certain dispatches. You will also remember that we weren't able to find these dispatches in anywhere near the completeness necessary for our purposes. We, therefore, resorted to the next best thing, that is, we used the radio records of the other commands on the same circuit. One of these was COM-THIRDFLT, another was CTG 38.1. It was my impression that we had other radio logs with which to check the above two. I don't recollect what these logs were, but I thought that one or more were from Task Force 38, and possibly from TFs 78 and 79.

However, apparently, we have been unable to locate any radio logs, other than the original two, i.e., TF 38 and TG 38.1. Do you happen to remember what radio logs we finally succeeded in obtaining?

Outside of that, how goes it over there in Morocco? Every now and then, when we hear of flareups, we suspect that maybe our bases may not be on very firm ground. However, since you only occupy the base, - I presume that you are not the base commander - all you have to do in an emergency is place Nellie and the baby in one of your planes, hop in yourself and head for more fertile land.

The weather is getting cooler now with temperatures nearing 40°F. Although it is cold, it is quite pleasant and I think gives everyone renewed vigor.

The Army-Navy football game will take place in about twelve more days, and I look for a Navy victory. However, the Army team is tough. I saw it beat Yale at a time when Yale was undefeated. Since that time Yale has collapsed, although she may defeat Harvard. Are you going to drive me back home from Philadelphia?

Everyone in the office sends their best regards. Please give my best, in addition, to Nellie and the baby. With best wishes, I am, as ever,

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

0650

16 November 1954

Dear Loud:

I am including you as a principal commander in Volume II of the Battle for Leyte Gulf because of your operations with the advance forces. I should appreciate your courtesy if you could advise me as to the name of your chief of staff at that time. I should like his Christian name as well as his surname. Unfortunately, and as you have perhaps already noted, it is customary in making plans to give only the surname and rank, with the result that great difficulty is encountered by anyone later in endeavoring to discover the true name of the officer.

I hope you are enjoying your new assignment in Japan. I am sure that you will accomplish most successful results if you employ the same skill that you employed in mine-sweeping.

With best regards, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Captain Wayne R. Loud, U.S. Navy
Chief of the Naval Section
MAAG, Navy Number 500
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

0651

24 November 1954

Dear Legs:

Every now and then I have to bother you about something and in this case it is rather important to bother you at this moment. We are making a film in New York at a firm known as Film Graphics Incorporated on the Battle of Savo Island. The artists have drawn a talker with a large steel helmet issuing messages over the TBS by what may be termed a long lead.

On the U.S.S. MINNEAPOLIS we employed the TBS by a telephone handset attached to the control box. I called the New York Navy Yard and they advised me that talkers often wore headsets of the nature referred to and that many ships were employing the flexible lead hooked into the control box at the time of the Battle of Savo Island.

I am interested in knowing, officially, whether you can advise me if this is so. Frankly, I hope that it is because it will save a lot of trouble and perhaps money that would otherwise be involved to redo some of the film.

New subject: I don't know whether you are going to the Army-Navy football game or not, but I am and I hope to see you there if you go. I am also going to the luncheon preceding the game which is being given by the Commandant, Fourth Naval District. If you are there, look for me.

I hope things are going well with you and that great bureau of yours. I saw Earl Mills last night and he seemed to be thriving in his job as President of Foster-Wheeler. With best regards to you and yours, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear Admiral Wilson D. Leggett, USN
Chief, Bureau of Ships
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0652

6 December 1954

Dear Roger:

I am in a sort of controversy with the Military History Section U.S. Army Headquarters Far East, over the rank of the commanding officers of the AMAGI, ZUIKAKU, HYUGA, ISE, YAMATO, MUSASHI, NAGATO, YAMASHIRO, FUSO, ATAGO, MYOKO, KONGO and HARUNA.

The Army says that the commanding officers of all these ships were Rear Admirals at the time of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. I have questioned this to the Far East and have received in return a statement that, as of October 15th, all of these officers were so promoted.

In contra-distinction, the Japanese were trained by the British and the British did not have Rear Admirals in command of their ships. The U.S. Navy did not have Rear Admirals in command of its ships either, although there were occasions when a Commodore commanded U.S. Navy ships, such as the WEST POINT.

Have you any information on this subject? Perhaps in the Japanese documents - that is, the action reports of these ships - there is a statement as to the ranks of the commanding officers.

I shall appreciate your thought in this matter and if you have none, perhaps you could write, through one of your private sources, to Japan and possibly get a verification to the above.

I think the Army source is Captain Ohmae. Unfortunately, the Army says that "the promotions order is not available at this time."

With best regards to you and with hopes that the things are proceeding well with you, I am, as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Roger Pineau
Room 1218 (OPNAV)
Main Navy
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0653

16 December 1954

Dear G.I.:

I was very sorry that you were not up here to see the showing of the Battle of Savo Island film, but I realize, of course, that you couldn't be here. I regret exceedingly your misfortune in having lost your Father. I lost mine about two years ago and it is a shock which time only can cure, because it is so final. I hope that everything otherwise is satisfactory with you and your family.

The showing went on quite well. We showed the film for two days, not only Parts I and II, which are complete in 16mm film, but also Part III which is in 35mm film.

The general reaction was very favorable indeed, but there are some points that must be corrected before any of this film is issued to the fleets. These are as follows:

a. The 16mm film seemed to be satisfactory in Part II, but it is not satisfactory in Part I. The reason for this seems to be that the background is different in Part I -- or in most of Part I -- than it is in Part II. Mr. Salter, who came here in the place of Mr. Blair, who could not come, said they had used the same background, and he could not understand what was the matter. Whether they did use the same background or not, the film is not satisfactory as it is.

b. There are several places in the 16mm film where night action is shown as day action. When I signed the papers so that Mr. Blair could obtain a portion of his payment, it was agreed that the "live" film would be monitored so that night film was night and day film was day. One case in point is the picture of the four-stack destroyer (SOUTHARD) which is departing at midnight from Guadalcanal with General Vandergrift on board. The picture shows the destroyer in broad daylight rather than at night and the following picture shows the Tulagi shore, or at least of the general area, also in daylight when it was also night. There is a scene where the Marines are landing which is daylight. (landed in daylight) but there is one night "shot" thrust in the middle of the day film. This indicates to me that the contract has not yet been completed. I don't know who is to blame for this, whether it is Mr. Blair or your office, but it is clear that someone is to blame and the corrections must be made.

c. Another fault of the 16mm film, that is, the first reels anyway of Part I, is the fact that it is difficult to keep it in focus. We thought that it was due to the machine which was certainly not satisfactory. However, later tests have shown that it was difficult to keep it in focus. I am not enough of a motion-

0654

16 December 1954

picture man to be able to estimate why this is so but our operators, who are experienced, feel that this film has something fundamentally wrong with it.

d. A very serious fault of Part I, in addition to the above, is the fact that one cannot read the names under the commanders. Evidently, the printing is too small. I cannot see how I am to blame for this because the art of making the films belongs with the contractor and the Naval Photographic Center. It has been promised that these films would be satisfactory. Because of the above errors, I cannot believe that they are.

e. There is a final point that we cannot do much about, I guess. It is this. Everything on the charts is name in "black". I was wondering about that before and spoke to Mr. Blair about it. He was so confident that black and white would show up clearly on the board that I bowed to his superior knowledge of the art. Perhaps it was alright with the 35mm film but it is not so with the 16mm film.

From the above, you can plainly see that I am quite disappointed on two or three factors connected with the 16mm film. Mr. Salter didn't know who made it. He didn't know whether it was made by his firm or your center. I didn't know either. Now the question arises about what we are going to do about it because the question of the legibility and the readability of the 16mm film, notably in Part I, is of serious concern.

Part III seems to be progressing favorably and I will discuss any problems there later. Mr. Salter suggested that I discuss them all with Mr. Blair when I come down to New York. I think that we had better arrange a meeting for about January 4th, 1955. Film Graphics has made some changes in some of the pictures which are excellent. However, I would have sworn that we said that we would not show the movement of Admiral Tsukahara from Tinian to Rabaul to relieve Admiral Mikawa of the FIFTH Fleet. I thought that I told Mr. Blair that we weren't too sure of that portion of it, that is, on what day he relieved him, although we are fairly sure. I, therefore, told Mr. Blair that, in my mind, we should use the same setup we had employed in the Battle of the Coral Sea to show the change in command. I don't think that this is vital, but it is serious enough to indicate that someone, somewhere, has not been following-up on the final agreements on Parts I and II.

0655

16 December 1954

From the above you might infer that I am thoroughly dissatisfied. This is far from the case. The film, as a whole, was excellent and I have received many encomiums from the staff and the students relating thereto. The battle lessons drawn throughout the film have hit hard among the students and staff and many have remarked already that they had learned a great deal.

I am going to California on Monday and will return about the 29th.

With best wishes to you and yours for a merry Christmas and a happy New Year, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. G. I. Johnson
U.S. Naval Photographic Center
U.S. Naval Air Station
Anacostia
Washington, D.C.

0656

9 December 1954

Dear Bowker:

I am writing to you for two reasons: one is to wish you and your family a very merry Christmas and a happy New Year; the other is to ask you whether you remember how you determined the times at the outer limits of the searches by the FOURTEENTH Air Force in the South China Sea.

If you will remember, the searches for (a) the East Course, were to leave Liuchow at 0800 and 2000 each day, head thence to Huiling Island, thence southeast to a point sixty miles northwest of Lingayen, south for sixty miles, southwest for 150 miles, thence northwest to the China coast and back to Liuchow and (b) the West Course were to leave Liuchow at 0800 and 2000 each day, head thence to Huiling Island, thence south 515 miles passing to the west of Paracel Reefs, then 170 miles northeast, then northward to the China coast and back to Liuchow passing to the east of the reefs.

For some reason we find the speeds of the easterly search to be about 50 miles faster than those of the westerly search on the outer leg. Since the total distance is 1650 miles, it seems logical to believe that plane speeds would average 165 knots. On that basis, we find that our times of arrival at the outer corners differ by more than an hour from the times shown on your chart. Can you clear this up?

Our weather has been rather bad around here. We have had temperatures of about 10°F with four inches of snow. However, it hasn't been too bad and today it is clearing which is gratifying indeed. On the other hand, I presume you are getting too much sun. No one is ever satisfied!

Several people have asked about you on occasions, the most recent inquirer being Captain Raborn.

I went to the Army-Navy football game and it was swell as you would expect. The Navy team played beautifully and deserved to win. The weather while there was cold but pleasant. I went there and back by air because the famous "Bowker Buick" was no longer available.

0657

9 December 1954

Once again, with best regards and best wishes for a merry Christmas and happy New Year, I am, as ever,

Sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Captain Albert H. Bowker, USN
Air Transport Squadron TWENTY-FOUR
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, N.Y.

0658

17 December 1954

Dear Lee:

I am very sorry that you were not up here to attend the showing of your film because things did not develop as well as both you and I had hoped. I think Mr. Salter has told you by now, to a degree, what was wrong but he was unable to tell me where the responsibility lay. Frankly, I don't know either. I have written G. I. Johnson a letter relative thereto which contains, in general, the data which I am about to give to you. In the first place, I want to say that the film, as a whole, is excellent and I have received much praise from everyone who has seen it; this is very gratifying because it shows that our concepts are right.

However, there are some very bad points in the film which will have to be rectified. The comments I have to offer are, in general, as follows:

a. The 16mm film seemed, in general, to be satisfactory in Part II, but it is not satisfactory in Part I. I told Mr. Salter and other people told him the same thing -- that it was evident that the backgrounds of the animation parts were different. Mr. Salter said this was not so; that they had all been filmed with the same background and that he could not understand what had caused the difficulty.

b. The black names are very difficult to read and most of the officers reported that they were unable to read them. In addition, they reported that the white names are so small that they could not read them, either. This seemed to apply even to those in the front seats. When you decided or recommended that the black geographical names be used I accepted your recommendation and G. I. Johnson's approval of them because I feel that you both are masters of your art. Therefore, I must conclude that you were wrong in your assumption or that the 16mm film reels have been improperly done.

c. There are several places in the film where night action is shown as day action. It was agreed, at the showing in Washington, that the "live" film would be monitored so that night film would be night and day film would be day. One case in point is the picture of the four-stack destroyer (SOUTHARD) which is departing Guadalcanal at midnight with General Vandergrift on board. The picture shows the destroyer in broad daylight, rather than at night, and the following live film picture shows the Tulagi shore, or at least part of that general area, also in daylight when it was likewise night. There is another series of live film showing the Marines landing. This

0659

17 December 1954

series is excellent except for the fact that there is one night "shot", I think of a carrier, thrust right in the middle of the day film. I showed these errors to Mr. Salter and he clearly noted them.

d. Another fault of the 16mm film, that is the first reels of Part I, is the fact that it is difficult to keep it in focus. I thought that this was due to the machine and this appeared to be so since the first machine we used was out of order. However, it doesn't seem to make much difference what machine is employed as the lack of clarity and definition as regards the focus still persists. I showed this to the operators afterwards (on Friday when Mr. Salter was not present) and the operator said that he didn't know what was the matter with the film -- that he showed a lot of 16mm film here and has never encountered any trouble with it before. He said also that with this film it would be in focus and suddenly would appear not to be. This required constant observation of the operator to obtain adequate clarity, legibility and readability even with an otherwise good film.

e. Part III seemed to be pretty good.

f. The only technical error, and something I think which will require change, is the service ribbons indicating battle experience. Not one person that I asked recognized them for what they were. I do think the idea is a clever one and could still be used if we show a Japanese officer, with an arrow indicating the service ribbons, or something of that nature. However, if we use service ribbons we have to make sure that they are Japanese and not U.S. One commentator said that the ribbons looked like "firecrackers or Christmas towels!" It would be preferable, I think, to show a couple of ships in action. My thought is that this might be preferable because it is too hard to discover the type of ribbons worn by the Japanese at this time.

g. Another point was the fact that I thought that we were not going to show the movement of Admiral Tsukahara from Tinian to Rabaul to relieve Admiral Mikawa of the FIFTH Fleet. I thought that we had decided that we would show this as we did in the Battle of the Coral Sea film. However, I do not consider that this is vital.

h. I think that the torpedo tracks, as shown, are a very considerable improvement. If I have any criticism, it is that they are a little too heavy. They could have been shown equally well by much lighter lines.

I don't want you to feel from the above that your showing up here was unsatisfactory; on the contrary, it was very satisfactory and I appreciate your assistance in making the film as good as it is. However, the above points are not good and should be rectified if the film is to be satisfactory for use in the fleet.

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17 December 1954

I have suggested to G. I. Johnson that we have a conference in your shop on January 4th or 5th, preferably the 4th, and then I can go right on to Washington from there and try to clear up the whole matter, whatever it may be. I have to be in Washington anyway so the whole thing can be settled in one blow.

With best wishes for a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, I am, as ever,

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Mr. Lee Blair
Film Graphics Inc.
245 West 55th St.
New York, N.Y.

0661